

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 02200 01 OF 02 232234Z

71

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-19 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 DODE-00 H-03 NSC-07 SS-20 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 SAM-01 NEA-10 DRC-01 /162 W

----- 031942

R 231830Z APR 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5303

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 2200

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: APR 18 SPC DISCUSSION OF FLANK SECURITY

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: A) USNATO 1954; B) STATE 56461

SUMMARY: AT APR 18 SPC MEETING ALLIES REFERRED ONLY PERIPHERALLY TO US PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING FLANK SECURITY ISSUE. WHILE SEEKING CLARIFICATION ON AND OFFERING AMENDMENTS TO UK FORMULATION PUT FORWARD APR 8, MAJORITY MOVED INCREASINGLY TOWARDS GREEK REPS VIEW THAT ALLIES SHOULD FIND AN "OBJECTIVE CRITERION" FOR SOLVING FLANK SECURITY PROBLEM.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02200 01 OF 02 232234Z

DURING DISCUSSION, TURKEY EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH ALL US FORMULATIONS; NORWAY INTRODUCED NEW ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE TO US FORMULATION D; AND FRG MADE CLEAR MOVE TOWARD FLANK POSITION BY ENDORSING UK FORMULATION. TURKISH REP CONCLUDED THAT FURTHER

ACTION ON US PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT ALLIED VIEWS ON SCOPE AND INTENT OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS. SPC RETURNS TO SUBJECT APR 25. IN GENERAL, WE INTEND TO HOLD TO US FORMULATIONS IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS, BUT BELIEVE IT INCREASINGLY NECESSARY TO DEVELOP OUT THINKING AND POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION ASPECT. END SUMMARY

1. FOLLOWING MC REPS REPORT ON MBFR WG REPORT ON PARA 30 MEASURES, FRG REP MADE LENGTHY AND RELATIVELY FORTHCOMING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF FLANKS. BONN AGREED WITH GREEK SUGGESTION TO FIND "PRAGMATIC" APPROACH TO FLANK SECURITY PROBLEM. SINCE WG HAD RULED AGAINST MEASURE 3, BUT BELIEVED ALLIES SHOULD STUDY MEASURE 6 FURTHER, SPC COULD USEFULLY FIND OTHER VARIANTS THAN THAT STUDIED BY WG TO GIVE EFFECT TO MEASURE. REGARDING US FORMULATIONS, BONN AGREED THAT ALLIES SHOULD MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY NEEDED FOR JOINT DEFENSE, BUT SHOULD INCLUDE IN THIS FLEXIBILITY DUE REGARD FOR FLANK SECURITY NEEDS. WHATEVER SOLUTION ALLIES FINALLY ADOPT SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED BEYOND WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO ASSURE FLANK SECURITY. AS TO UK FORMULA (SEE PARA 3 REF A), BONN FOUND IT USEFUL AND WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT IT WITH INCLUSION OF PHRASE "ON A PERMANENT BASIS" AFTER WORD "FORCES," AND IN LIEU OF CURRENT WORD "PERMANENTLY" WHICH WAS LESS EMPHATIC. IN BONN'S VIEW, AN APPROPRIATE NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA SHOULD THEN BE ADDED TO UK PROPOSAL. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD THUS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT US DESIRE NOT TO MENTION TERRITORIES IN THE USSR, BUT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE FLANKS WITH POSITIVE ASSURANCES.

2. NORWEGIAN REP SAID OSLO FAVORED UK PROPOSAL, BUT WOULD LIKE "PERMANENTLY" DROPPED SO AS NOT TO INHIBIT ALLIANCE REINFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS. AS A SECOND PREFERENCE, OSLO WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS A FORMULATION ON THE BASIS OF ONE OF THE FIVE US PROPOSALS, WITH FORMULA D COUPLED TO THE UK PROPOSAL BEING THE MOST SATISFACTORY.

3. ONLY ALLY TO SUPPORT ANY US FORMULATIONS OUTRIGHT WAS CANADA, WHICH ALSO FAVORED FORMULA D. AS TO UK FORMULA,
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02200 01 OF 02 232234Z

OTTAWA HAD DIFFICULTY WITH TERMS "ADJACENT" AND "PERMANENTLY" BOTH OF WHICH COULD BE AMBIGUOUSLY INTERPRETED. LATTER WORD MIGHT FURTHERMORE INHIBIT REDEPLOYMENT IN ANY EMERGENCY LASTING FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD. DUTCH REP SUPPORTED THIS VIEW, AND SAID THE HAGUE DID NOT KNOW TO WHICH AREAS THE WORD "ADJACENT" ACTUALLY REFERRED; DID IT INCLUDE HUNGARY, FOR EXAMPLE? TO ILLUSTRATE DIFFICULTY, HE SAID THAT IF SOVIETS WERE NOT ALLOWED TO REDEPLOY TO ANY ADJACENT AREAS, THIS MEANT THEY WOULD HAVE TO RELOCATE WITHDRAWN FORCES IN THE 3WMD'S; IS THIS WHAT ALLIES INTENDED? UK REP REPLIED THAT LONDON DID NOT HAVE HUNGARY IN MIND IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT. HE ADDED THAT WORD "PERMANENTLY" WAS INTENDED PRECISELY TO COVER NATO'S TRAINING AND

REINFORCEMENT REQUIREMENTS, AND THAT AMBIGUITIES COULD ARISE.

4. TURKISH REP SAID THAT ANKARA WAS NOT HAPPY WITH ANY OF THE FIVE US FORMULATIONS. TAKEN ALONE, ANY ONE OF THEM WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE INSUFFICIENT TO COVER SERIOUS FLANK SECURITY CONCERNS. PROBLEM MIGHT NOT BE SO GREAT IF A FORMULATION ALONG US LINES WERE COUPLED TO A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION. TURNING TO PARA 30 MEASURES, AND RECALLING THAT WG HAD FOUND THEM ACCEPTABLE IF APPLIED UNILATERALLY, TURKISH REP ASKED WHY ALLIES COULD NOT PUT FORWARD A MEASURE TO PROTECT FLANKS, WHICH THEY WOULD SPECIFY AS BEING FOR UNILATERAL APPLICATION ONLY. ALLIES HAD NO INDICATION AT THIS POINT THAT SOVIETS WOULD REJECT SUCH A PROPOSAL, AND IF SOVIETS DID IN FACT COUNTER IT WITH RECIPROCITY, ALLIES COULD THEN RECONSIDER THEIR OWN PROPOSAL. MEANWHILE, TREND OF DISCUSSION IN SPC INDICATED THAT ALLIES SHOULD QUICKLY TAKE UP NON-CIRCUMVENTION ISSUE, SINCE FURTHER ACTION ON FLANK SECURITY NOW APPEARED TO BE INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON WHAT ALLIES COULD AGREE TO ON THIS SUBJECT. COMMENT: TURKS APPEAR TO THIN A SEPARATE AND GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION WOULD REINFORCE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. END COMMENT

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 02200 02 OF 02 232243Z

71

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-19 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 DODE-00 H-03 NSC-07 SS-20 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 SAM-01 NEA-10 DRC-01 /162 W

----- 032056

R 231830Z APR 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5304

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 2200

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

5. US REP SAID HE WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT ALLIES HAD NOT REACTED TO US PAPER OTHER THAN NEGATIVELY OR IN RELATION TO PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY OTHERS. STRESSING SINCERE EFFORTS US HAS MADE TO MEET FLANK SECURITY CONCERNS, HE DOUBTED THAT US WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO BEYOND SPECIFICITY OF FORMULATIONS IT HAD PROPOSED. HOPEFULLY, ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE FULLER COMMENTARY ON US PROPOSALS, WHICH HE WOULD WANT TO REPORT IN DETAIL TO WASHINGTON.

6. GREEK REP REPLIED THAT SINCE US WAS CALLING FOR REACTIONS, HE WAS PREPARED TO OFFER SOME COMMENTS. ALTHOUGH APPRECIATIVE OF US WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE A FLANK SECURITY SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02200 02 OF 02 232243Z

PROVISION, CONTENT OF US PROPOSALS WERE NOTHING MORE THAN A REPETITION OF A PRINCIPLE TO WHICH EAST AND WEST HAD ALREADY AGREED. APPLICATION OF ANY OF US FORMULATIONS INTRODUCED A SUBJECTIVE CRITERION REGARDING THE LEGITIMACY OF ANY SOVIET REDEPLOYMENTS. QUESTION THAT ALLIES NEEDED TO DETERMINE WAS HOW THEY COULD INSURE THAT SOVIET REDEPLOYMENTS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLE ALREADY AGREED TO. WHAT FLANKS WERE AFTER--AND UK WAS NOW INCLUDING IN ITS FORMULATION--IS AN OBJECTIVE CRITERION. ONLY ONE ANYBODY COULD THINK OF WAS THAT CHARACTERIZED BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA. IF OTHERS COULD DEVISE ANY OTHER OBJECTIVE CRITERION, FLANKS WOULD LISTEN CAREFULLY. TURKISH REP WARMLY SUPPORTED GREEK VIEW, AND SAID ONLY REAL DIFFICULTY FOR ALLIES NOW IS TO FIND AN OBJECTIVE CRITERION TO BUILD INTO PROVISION LANGUAGE. AS HE SAW IT, MAIN OBSTACLE HERE WAS US UNWILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS AREAS WHICH CONSTITUTE THE ONLY KNOWN CRITERION OF EVALUATION.

7. NORWEGIAN REP SAID HE HAD PERSONAL PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD MARRY US FORMULATION D WITH GREEK-TURKISH IDEAS. FORMULATION WOULD BE TO SUBSTITUTE "FOR EACH PARTY" AT END OF CURRENT TEXT FOR "PARTICIPANTS HAVING A SPECIAL STATUS." ADD-ON SENTENCE WOULD THEN READ: "FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM THE REDUCTION AREAS SHOULD NOT BE REDEPLOYED INTO AREAS ADJACENT TO THE TERRITORY OF THESE PARTICIPANTS."

8. US REP SAID THAT NEW IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY NORWEGIANS AND UK CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE ADDITION TO US FORMULATIONS. FURTHERMORE, ALL NEW PROPOSALS FOR LANGUAGE CHANGES SEEM TO LEAD ALLIES TOWARD CONSIDERING MEASURES FOR AREAS OUTSIDE THE NGA. SUCH PROPOSALS, HE FELT, WOULD ONLY REINFORCE KNOWN US CONCERNS TOWARDS EXPANDING THE AREA COVERED BY MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. FURTHERMORE, THE US FORMULATIONS WENT BEYOND SIMPLE REITERATION OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY PRINCIPLE.

9. CHAIRMAN ASKED WHETHER IS SHOULD NOW PUT TOGETHER LIST OF PROPOSALS MADE THUS FAR, TO WHICH TURKISH REP REPLIED THAT SPC

SHOULD AWAIT SUBMISSION OF MORE IDEAS, PARTICULARLY REGARDING NON-CIRCUMVENTION. HE FELT ALLIES MIGHT MAKE PROGRESS IF THE TWO PROVISIONS COULD BE STUDIED IN CONJUNCTION WITH EACH OTHER. SPC AGREED TO COME BACK TO QUESTION APR 25.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02200 02 OF 02 232243Z

10. COMMENT: FLANKS ARE CLEARLY MAKING EFFORT TO AVOID CONSIDERING US FORMULATIONS AS SOLE BASIS FOR DEVELOPING A FLANK SECURITY PROVISION. AS WE SEE SITUATION UNFOLDING, FLANKS ARE ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE (AS SUGGESTED IN PARA 7, REF A) NOW BE ENGAGING OTHER ALLIES ON UNDERLYING REDEPLOYMENT QUESTION. AIRM HERE IS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST AS WELL AS THAT OF FLANKS TO CLARIFY AREAS IN WHICH SOVIETS CAN AND CANNOT RELOCATE WITHDRAWN FORCES. US FORMULATION, FRG REACTIONS AND RATHER INTERESTING NORWEGIAN REINVOLVEMENT IN DISCUSSION ARE OBVIOUS RESULTS.

11. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS, WE WILL IN GENERAL CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO FOCUS DEBATE ON US FORMULATIONS AND TO AVOID ANY INDICATION OF FLEXIBILITY IN US POSITION, IN ORDER TO BRAKE BUILDUP OF SUPPORT FOR MEASURE ON FLANKS. WE BELIEVE IT MAY BE HELPFUL, HOWEVER, TO DEVELOP US THINKING ON THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION CONCEPT SINCE SOME ASPECTS OF IT APPEAR TO INTEREST FLANK COUNTRIES. IN ADDITION, WE THINK IT MIGHT HELP OUR PRESENTATION OF US PROPOSALS IF MISSION COULD GIVE ALLIES SOME INDICATION OF THE KINDS OF STATEMENTS WE WOULD MAKE TO WP COUNTRIES IN EXPLAINING WHAT KIND OF BEHAVIOR THEY WOULD BE COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO IN ACCEPTING ONE OF THE FIVE US ALTERNATIVE FORMULAE. RUMSFELD

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 APR 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO02200
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740482/abbryumh.tel
Line Count: 248
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A) USNATO 1954; B) STATE 56461
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 MAY 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: WITHDRAWN <20-Jul-2001 by reddocgw, RDFRD>; RELEASED <07 MAY 2002 by golinofr>; APPROVED <07 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: APR 18 SPC DISCUSSION OF FLANK SECURITY
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO ANKARA
ATHENS
BONN
LONDON
OSLO

VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USDOCOSOUTH

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005